How to increase car ownership

Hatred of cars is often based on the idea that they create inequality. But this viewpoint is marked by a high degree of hypocrisy. The main reason low-income households struggle to afford a vehicle is precisely because anti-car policymakers have imposed huge additional costs on car ownership.

This is particularly reprehensible because increasing the population’s mobility would bring enormous economic benefits. Increased car ownership would improve access to job and business opportunities, enabling workers to find employment that better matches their skills and talents.

Leisure and housing options would be expanded by easy access to an increased number of locations. A greater choice of retail outlets would be available, enabling more households to exploit the economics of scale associated with large shops and bulk buying.

There would be social benefits too. For example, making it easier to visit and help out elderly and disabled family members.

Currently approximately 78% of households in England have access to a car or van, with 33% of households having access to two or more. The figures are broadly similar in other parts of the UK. But growth in car ownership levels has stagnated since the early 2000s, following rapid growth in previous decades.

Moreover, car ownership is much lower than average among households in the bottom two income deciles. Although there are several factors involved, this suggests the high cost of motoring is likely to play an important role.

The list below provides various policies that could be implemented to increase these figures and improve mobility. Many of these ideas are highly contentious and are included here in order to stimulate debate. A full discussion of each proposal is beyond the scope of this post. Their pros and cons will be analysed in more detail in a series of future articles.

  • Scrap fuel duty and road tax (VED).
  • Abolish compulsory vehicle insurance.
  • Remove trade barriers that deter the importation of low-cost cars from countries such as India and China. This should include non-tariff regulatory barriers.
  • Simplify the driving test and lower the cost of passing.
  • Withdraw “low-emission zones”, “congestion charges” and other local levies.
  • Discontinue the annual MOT test.
  • Abandon the forced shift to electric vehicles.
  • Deregulate taxis and other car-based businesses.

The main objections to higher car ownership are that it would worsen congestion, pollution and road safety.

It’s important to understand that an increase in ownership among lower-income groups wouldn’t lead to a proportionate increase in usage. The new motorists would tend to face greater financial constraints than the average driver. For purposes of illustration, an increase in ownership from say 78% of households to 88% might only increase traffic levels by say 5%.

However, many of the measures to remove barriers to car ownership among the poor would also benefit existing motorists, an effect which is likely to have a bigger impact.

Congestion could be mitigated by re-instating roads that have recently been closed as part of various anti-car schemes. Road narrowing measures could also be reversed, particularly at junctions; the number of traffic lights and other controls reduced; and efficient one-way systems restored in town centres.

Bus and cycle lanes are barely used on many routes and could be removed to increase capacity for cars, vans and lorries. In suitable locations, heavily loss-making railways could be taken out, with the paths redeployed as fast, congestion-free toll roads. And, why not rip up red tape and allow the private sector to provide new road capacity? The planning system can also be liberalised to allow low-density developments rather than stacking and packing vast numbers of people into already crowded inner cities.

The pollution problem is a bit of a red herring, as air quality has improved enormously over the last few decades, partly due to de-industrialisation, but also better vehicle technology. Any conceivable increase in car ownership would make little difference to this long-term trend. (And any purported effect on “climate change” would also be trivial).  

Reversing the artificial delays caused by anti-car policies would help mitigate the likely small impact on emissions from higher car ownership, as would the above suggestion of chanelling a high proportion of traffic onto congestion-free former railways and new private roads.

Finally, if the new car owners have shifted from riskier modes such as motorcycles, there could be safety benefits. It’s also possible that voluntary insurance cover would encourage a proportion of the new drivers to behave more responsibly, given the enhanced financial risks of accidents.

In a healthy, growing economy, with improving living standards, it should be natural for the population’s mobility to increase, which in turn delivers productivity improvements and creates further wealth. Yet politicians and officials seem hellbent on undermining the benefits of lower transport costs and improved access, despite their proven role as key drivers of economic progress.

While this article has set out ways of increasing the public’s mobility, in reality the reverse is happening. Punitive new charges are being imposed and costly red tape expanded. Levies such as low-emission zones specifically target poorer motorists.

The political elite must know all this will have a severely negative impact on the victims’ economic opportunities and also inflict wider social damage. Perhaps a failing economy and falling living standards are the true goals of their radical green agenda.

First published on the Transport Watch blog.

Why did the Conservatives become radical greens?

It’s deeply disturbing that a supposedly conservative government has been destroying property rights, undermining the middle classes and strangling the economy – all in the name of the environment. How on earth did this happen?

Looking at the incentives facing the party’s leaders might provide some clues.

The obvious explanation is they’re doing it to attract votes. To win the next election they need to go beyond their core support. So, they have to reach out to the centre, perhaps to voters who might consider backing the Lib Dems.

Such calculations also factor in the marginal seats needed to retain a majority and the particular voter groups they therefore need to attract. To give a specific example, a “green” policy of opposing Heathrow expansion might be cynically designed to gain marginal seats in south-west London.

However, if this strategy has been at play, then it is likely to have backfired spectacularly. The government’s green agenda is a major factor in a cost-of-living crisis that has caused its support to plummet.

Moreover, the Conservative majority relies on working-class voters in the North and Midlands – a group that has suffered particularly badly as energy bills have rocketed and real incomes declined.

Many voters don’t connect the cost-of-living crisis to green policies. Indeed, media propagandists deliberately hide the link by blaming other things.

The inconvenient truth is that the UK’s heavy dependence on imported gas is a direct result of the renewable energy agenda and in particular the forced closure of cheap and reliable coal-fired power stations. But whether voters understand this or not, they still tend to blame the government for the consequences and the marked decline in their living standards. 

So, the “going green to attract votes” hypothesis doesn’t stack up. If this was a factor, then it has been a huge miscalculation. In any case, more moderate measures combined with some environmentalist rhetoric could have ticked the “green box” without doing such immense damage to the economy.

A second possible explanation is that the government has to conform with the “metropolitan elite” in order to retain power. This group, so the theory goes, has different values and priorities to the rest of the country. It also has immense influence because it dominates the media, civil service and other pillars of the establishment.

London-centred, its members use public transport far more than people outside the capital. An often-vocal minority cycle to work. Many of them live in gentrified, densely populated inner-city areas, a very different environment to that experienced by the suburban and rural rich.

15-minute cities might seem normal and desirable to them. But in reality, the purchasing power of this group and the local services it supports are very far from the norm, and could not be replicated in more than a relatively small number of locations.

It seems likely that support for radical environmentalism is significantly stronger in the metropolitan elite than the general population. The Conservatives perhaps fear that reversing the radical green agenda would alienate this group, leading to negative media coverage, obstructive behaviour by the civil service and other problems.

Some Conservative politicians may also want to be part of this “elite” in order to enjoy the status, connections and financial rewards that come with it. If they reject the green agenda, they risk being ostracised.

It’s alarming to think that a small, privileged minority, concentrated in London, effectively has the whip hand over policies that affect the whole population, but this conclusion is certainly plausible when the incentives facing policymakers are considered.

A third hypothesis can almost certainly be rejected. Cynics often believe that politicians effectively get paid to implement various agendas.

A number of corporate interests are making vast profits from green measures. And it’s true they have a strong economic incentive to “capture” policy by investing in lobbying.

But this doesn’t seem to be taking the form of politicians benefiting financially. There are relatively few examples of former ministers getting well-paid jobs at renewable energy companies or other firms that benefit from green policies – and these may well be cases where the individuals concerned have genuine expertise in the industry. The phenomenon certainly isn’t widespread enough to explain government policy.

Moreover, there are also powerful vested interests that will lose out from the radical green agenda. They are attempting to sway politicians too – but, again, there is little evidence that this takes the form of substantial financial inducements. As previous scandals have shown, the reputational risks from exposure would be very high on both sides, which acts as a strong deterrent to any untoward activity.

Finally, there is the possibility that a significant number of ministers and MPs genuinely believe in radical environmentalism. It’s not about their careers, social status, or even the money, but ideological.

It’s striking that a significant proportion of Conservative MPs are not very conservative at all. They already support high taxes, heavy regulation, technocracy, political globalism, central planning, and rapid social change. This arguably makes them natural allies of the radical green agenda.

Their approach couldn’t be more different from genuinely conservative policies to protect the environment. These could focus on bolstering conservation and stewardship by restoring traditional property rights undermined by the state. For example, respecting private property by ending the practice of compulsory purchase would prevent a great deal of environmental damage.  

The key question is therefore how this not very conservative group came to dominate the Conservative Party and subsequently steer environmental policy in a non-conservative direction.

Whatever the real reason, the result is that the UK is effectively a one-party state when it comes to the radical green agenda. All the main parties support it and voters have little realistic choice.   

First published on the Transport Watch blog.

15-minute cities and the new feudal system

While the power elite will continue to enjoy their jet-set lifestyles, the general public will increasingly be restricted to 15-minute cities as “climate lockdowns” are imposed.

Serfs weren’t allowed to leave their village without their master’s permission. They spent their whole lives restricted to a small area, except perhaps for a rare pilgrimage. As councils start to require permits to drive down certain roads or into certain areas, the parallels with the feudal system are obvious.

15-minute cities are superficially attractive. The basic idea is that employment, retail outlets, health services, schools and various other amenities should be easily accessible to people’s homes – indeed within a short, 15-minute walk or cycle ride. This new urban geography is designed to reduce car dependency and foster “stronger communities.”

Encouraging walking and cycling is a key aspect of the policy, though in practical application this has meant using a big stick rather than a carrot.

The road space available to cars is reduced to make way for cycle lanes or wider pavements. Speed limits are lowered; traffic lights increased; parking restricted; obstacles placed in the road; streets closed.

These measures create delays and impose costs on motorists, reducing their mobility and deterring them from travelling outside their immediate area.     

Indeed, proponents of 15-minute cities admit that mobility is not their priority. Because, they hope, key amenities are accessible locally, they argue mobility is no longer needed to the same extent.

But here the movement hits a major hurdle: economies of scale.

Many services are inefficient or not viable at a micro level. In a relatively free economy, this means they would tend to be driven out of business by more efficient competitors that serve a larger catchment area and population.

An obvious illustration is to compare big edge-of-town supermarkets with the same brands’ “local” iterations, the latter having far less choice and significantly higher prices. Consumers often choose to drive further to a big supermarket in order to do a weekly shop in one go, which may be cheaper and more efficient than making frequent visits on foot or by bike to smaller local stores. (Of course, staying at home, shopping online and waiting for deliveries is another option under the 15-minute-city model – which may explain why the Big Tech elite are promoting it so enthusiastically.)

The 15-minute city concept therefore implies using planning controls and mobility restrictions to hinder the economies of scale associated with larger catchment areas – effectively forcing businesses and consumers to stay local. Accordingly, such policies are now commonplace across the UK, Western Europe and “progressive” US cities, representing a shift to command-and-control economics and a further erosion of private property rights.

There are similar issues with labour markets. If mobility is restricted – for example, by slower journeys or a forced reduction in car ownership – then it becomes harder for potential employees to find jobs that match their skills and talents. The size of the area in which they can access opportunities may shrink dramatically. The same problem applies to many small businesses. Productivity and wages suffer. Welfare dependency may increase.

The 15-minute-city movement seeks to overcome the economies of scale problem through high-density living. If large numbers of people are stacked on top of one another in blocks of small apartments, then a population of tens of thousands can be packed into a square mile. But given current rates of new home construction, it will typically take several decades to densify neighbourhoods in this way. Lost economies of scale will not be replaced in the foreseeable future.

Moreover, high-density districts have disturbing social and political implications. Residents of detached houses on large plots are relatively free to engage in various activities without affecting their neighbours. Their physical environment promotes self-reliance, independence and resilience. They have the space to accumulate possessions, resources and reserves; make repairs; start various businesses; even grow their own food.

By contrast, high-density apartment blocks are characterised by monitoring and surveillance; rules and regulations; permits; conflicts over communal space, repairs and maintenance. Eccentric, offensive or anti-social behaviour may affect a large number of neighbours, providing a rationale for meddling and intervention. This kind of neighbourhood promotes a culture of interfering in other people’s lives.

And residents of small apartments can’t own much. Their possessions and real resources are severely limited by lack of physical space. They have relatively little scope for self reliance and are more vulnerable to becoming dependent on the state in any crisis. They are therefore more controllable.

15-minute cities are an attempt to manipulate the built environment in order to undermine individual freedom. They’re a Trojan horse for big government and top-down control.

First published on the Transport Watch blog.

Political manipulation and the push for climate lockdowns

The plan is clear. The political elite want to create what amounts to a new feudal system, with the manipulation of the green agenda providing a convenient pretext. 

Ordinary people’s mobility will be severely restricted. They will be forced out of their cars and off the roads by a raft of new charges and controls. Their lives will largely be confined to “15-minute cities.”

But the perpetrators have a problem. These measures are deeply unpopular with a large percentage of the public. And they are being imposed in ostensible democracies. So, they need a strategy to overcome resistance.

One element is a relentless propaganda campaign to promote the idea of a “climate emergency.” With clear parallels to the manipulation strategies deployed during the pandemic, they’re trying to persuade the public that a form of lockdown is necessary to stop global warming.

This is why the BBC lectures viewers on climate change every time there’s a heat wave, flooding or forest fires. It’s also why the BBC has effectively banned proper debate on environmental issues, with sceptical voices not welcome on its outlets. The understandable anguish created by images of natural disasters is used to undermine free speech on the issue.

The second element is a focus on local government. There’s a reason why mayors and councils are taking a leading role in the “climate lockdowns” policy, while central government pretends to be more motorist friendly. The establishment is exploiting the different incentives facing members of the public.

The benefits of measures such as “low-traffic neighbourhoods” (LTNs) are highly concentrated and obvious to the relatively small number of beneficiaries. By contrast, the costs, which may be enormous by comparison, are typically dispersed and not always obvious to the losers.

If a through road is closed off by the council, many of its residents will support the new restriction (though some may be against – for example if it means much longer journeys). Their street may be quieter and perhaps safer. This constituency offers a bedrock of support for such measures.

It will be bolstered by locals ideologically wedded to the green agenda, perhaps the result of a lifetime of indoctrination by schools, universities and the media, with no exposure to the counter arguments.

They will be joined by state-funded “sock puppets” – campaign groups paid by government to lobby itself and create a fake impression of wider support for policies that the political elite have already decided to impose.

By focusing on the local level, the instigators can build a sufficient coalition of supporters to at least make the argument that they’re not imposing their agenda despite overwhelming public opposition.

Indeed, many of the losers from such policies will not even live or vote in the borough or city where the new controls are being installed. They may be commuters or businesses now facing prohibitive charges or massive delays to their journeys.

Residents in areas beyond the schemes may see a big increase in congestion as traffic is displaced. The emergency services might become less efficient as they can no longer take a direct route, or because cycle lanes mean motorists can no longer get out of their way to let them pass. Labour mobility, productivity and wages may decline because potential employees can’t reach jobs that match their skills, and economies of scale may be lost as the populations that can be profitably or efficiently served shrink (click here for a more detailed discussion).

It will not always be obvious to people that the “war on motorists” is to blame for these negative economic impacts, which in turn dilutes political resistance to the new restrictions. And these effects are spread over a much wider geographical area than the benefits (that accrue to a small, concentrated group), which means opposition is harder to coordinate.  

Note that the purported non-local environmental gains are quite tenuous. The costs and benefits of any future climate change are impossible to calculate accurately. And the impact of the new controls will be negligible in terms of global emissions. In any case, anti-car policies are often counterproductive. Artificially created congestion can actually increase pollution.

Rather than restricting ordinary people’s mobility – and effectively creating a new feudal system in the process – policymakers should focus on win-win policies that both cut emissions and benefit the economy. This means ending the vast subsidies pumped into various polluting activities.

It speaks volumes that governments are so reluctant to take this obvious step. The green agenda is really about giving even more power to the elite and their institutions rather than saving the planet.  

First published on the Transport Watch blog.

Why the war on motorists is wrecking the economy

The government used the pandemic as a pretext to intensify the “war on motorists”, a key element of the elite’s Build Back Better agenda.

Councils were paid to close vast numbers of streets to through traffic, often as part of so-called Low Traffic Neighbourhood schemes. Main roads were narrowed and cycle lanes expanded. Punitive new charges were imposed, in particular London’s Ultra Low Emissions Zone levy, and there are now plans to roll out similar schemes to other cities.

These draconian measures made little sense in terms of the Covid-19 narrative. If anything, car travel should have been encouraged to reduce the spread of the disease. Instead, these policies almost certainly forced more people to use public transport than otherwise would have been the case – despite the apparent infection risks.

Government mismanagement of the pandemic also had a devastating impact on the economy. A massive state spending binge, combined with central bank money-printing on a huge scale, contributed to a cocktail of soaring inflation, a cost-of-living crisis and ballooning public debt.

The obvious way out of this predicament is to adopt policies that facilitate robust economic growth. This would increase tax revenues without a harmful rise in tax rates, thereby mitigating the government debt issue. It would also tend to increase real wages, addressing the cost-of-living problem.

The key to generating growth is rising productivity. But today many government policies seem to be deliberately designed to reduce productivity and undermine improvements in living standards. The war on motorists is a prime example.

A series of measures seem deliberately designed to increase congestion. These include a big rise in the number of traffic lights; the narrowing of junctions to reduce flows; the reduction of road space to make way for bus and cycle lanes; the widening of pavements; and the closure of through routes.

The resulting traffic jams lead to major productivity losses, with drivers wasting time sitting in their vehicles and burning fuel while stopping and starting repeatedly. While it is hard to put a precise figure on the resulting costs to the economy, estimates for losses from congestion in the UK are as high as £40 billion a year.

But the negative impact of anti-car measures goes far beyond this. Journeys are delayed even when there is no congestion. Motorists are stopped by traffic lights even in the middle of the night when the streets are empty. They have to crawl along at 20mph in boroughs where speed limits have been slashed. They have to take long diversions where through roads have been blocked off in so-called low-traffic neighbourhoods. And they have to drive around finding somewhere convenient to park because the council has restricted the number of spaces.

The impact of all this on productivity is especially obvious in the cases of delivery drivers and tradesmen. A delivery driver can make fewer deliveries in a given amount of time due to the artificial delays and diversions. A plumber or electrician can make fewer repairs due to the additional time required to travel between jobs.

In addition, the productivity of the retail sector is negatively affected. Because it takes longer to travel to a given outlet, shops will tend to be smaller, serving a lower population, thereby reducing economies of scale and efficiency. The delays will have a similar impact on distribution, favouring smaller and less efficient warehouses rather than larger, more efficient ones a greater distance apart.

Employment opportunities are also harmed. If a potential worker is prepared to commute for an hour each way, then the delays will reduce the size of the area in which he or she is prepared to take a job. With fewer options available, workers are less likely to find employment that is a good match for their skills – an outcome that again will tend to reduce productivity.

Similarly, businesses will have a smaller pool of potential workers available. They may struggle to find the right people. An entrepreneur might decide to build a smaller and less-efficient factory because the number of suitable workers within its catchment area is lower than otherwise would be the case. And clusters of expertise, together with associated competition and innovation, will tend to be negatively affected due to the shrinkage of the talent available in any given location.  

The negative effects on labour mobility will of course be multiplied if the war on the motorist leads workers to abandon car ownership entirely. Vast swathes of the country are poorly served by public transport, which typically isn’t viable outside urban areas with a high population density and core routes between cities. Commuting by public transport is often completely impractical in the outer suburbs, yet alone in rural areas.

This article has only scratched the surface in terms of the damage being done. The enormous impact of anti-car policies on ambulances and the other emergency services hasn’t been discussed, for example.

The big question is whether our politicians understand the scale of the harm they’re inflicting.  Perhaps they think the ends of this draconian top-down agenda justify the means.

First published on the Transport Watch blog.

Should HS2 be converted into a road?

Imagine the following nightmare scenario for HS2.

Phase One opens in 2033, around seven years later than originally planned, and tens of billions over budget.

To make matters worse, travel patterns have changed dramatically since High Speed 2 was first conceived. Routine business meetings now take place online, meaning demand for business travel has collapsed.

At the same time, a high proportion of professionals now work from home most of the week. They come into the office only occasionally and often avoid travelling during peak hours. The misery of long-distance rail commuting has largely been consigned to the past – at least for higher income groups.

HS2 still attracts a large number of passengers, though as with HS1, far fewer than forecast when the project was approved. The government has deliberately been slowing down services on the West Coast Main Line (WCML). As predicted, they have rigged the rail market to push more passengers onto the new route.

Competition is still a problem, however. Because few business travellers are using HS2, the vast majority of passengers are day-trippers, tourists, students and so on. They will switch to a slower journey on the WCML, the Chiltern Line, or even the coach if it saves them a few pounds. Inevitably this puts downward pressure on fares.

HS2 therefore faces financial disaster. Its construction was never going to be commercially viable, but it now requires heavy subsidies just to cover its operating costs.

And there are other clouds on the horizon. Driverless cars are finally being rolled out. While their top speed is lower, door-to-door journeys are often quicker than by HS2 – and far more convenient too, particularly for the elderly and those carrying luggage. The demand for rail is being further eroded.

HS2 has therefore become a major headache for ministers. They’ve already wasted tens of billions building the scheme and now it’s going to cost billions more to keep it running. In practice, this will mean cutting services on other parts of the network. After years of economic stagnation, the Treasury can no longer justify vast subsidies for the rail industry.

But there could be a solution.

Converting HS2 into a road has the potential to turn a heavily loss-making white elephant into a profitable business that could cover its operating costs and perhaps help to fill the financial black hole left by the project’s construction.

The government has claimed that up to 18 trains per hour, in each direction, could run along the southern section of HS2. Each train would carry up to 1,100 passengers. This amounts to roughly 20,000 passengers per hour. However, there is widespread scepticism that the planned frequency can be achieved in practice, particularly when many of the services are likely to experience delays on the legacy network before they join the new high-speed line.

Nevertheless, conversion into a road would massively increase potential capacity. Should the market demand it, the route could be managed to eliminate congestion and to maximise passenger numbers. Applying conservative assumptions, 600 coaches an hour, or one every six seconds, could carry 30,000 passengers an hour in each direction with 50 passengers per vehicle. (There are several real-world examples of busways achieving similar results). And obviously there would be relatively simple ways of increasing capacity further, for example by using driverless technology to reduce the gap between vehicles. A two-second gap – frequently observed already on motorways – equates to 1,800 vehicles per hour, or 90,000 passengers – around five times an optimistic figure for HS2.

As for journey times, it’s true that HS2 would reach a far higher top speed than the coaches. However, door-to-door journey times are what counts. The coaches would boast a far higher service frequency. Perhaps one would leave central Birmingham every minute. Better still, they could serve a much wider range of destinations, offering direct services into London and other places on or near the route from a large number of towns, villages and suburbs. Services could use the existing road network before joining and after leaving the former HS2. In this way, a far larger population could benefit directly from the new infrastructure.

Similarly, in London services could go to numerous destinations directly and wouldn’t have to terminate at Euston – perhaps continuing to the West End, City or Victoria Coach Station, for example. This in-built flexibility – which could also open up the route to shorter commuter journeys within the south-east – offers the potential of using the path of HS2 far more intensively than under existing plans.   

The shift in travel patterns detailed above suggests that an ultra-high-capacity route might not be needed. In this case, spare “slots” could be sold to cars and goods vehicles, raising additional revenue and taking pressure off the motorway network. A congestion-free road into central London could prove extremely valuable.

While it has not been possible to cover every aspect of railway conversion in this article (for more details and technical analysis, see the main Transport Watch website), the evidence suggests this option would provide higher capacity at significantly lower cost than HS2 – which would translate into lower fares and eliminate the need for operating subsidies. In addition, there would be major benefits from the greater flexibility to adapt to changing market conditions and new technologies. Finally, there could be significant environmental benefits, with lower top speeds translating into less noise and reduced energy consumption compared with HS2. (Given current policies, it is assumed that the road vehicles using the route would be electric by the mid-2030s).   

Going back to the situation in 2022, the best option remains cancellation of the entire High Speed 2 project. Even though billions have already been spent, the remaining budget would still deliver much higher returns if redeployed elsewhere (see the sunk-cost fallacy). Nevertheless, at some stage over the next few years Phase 1 of HS2 will hit the point of no return – not least due to the political embarrassment from abandoning it as it nears completion.    

When this happens, wouldn’t it make sense for ministers to reconsider the final trajectory of the scheme? Clearly it would be less costly to decide on the road option at a relatively early stage rather than installing a railway, and all its paraphernalia, only to rip it out a few years later.

First published on the Transport Watch blog.