A radical proposal for privatising the UK’s road network

For decades governments have used motorists as a cash cow. Fuel duty and road tax now raise around £35 billion a year, while less than £10 billion is spent on road maintenance and improvements. Indeed, as motoring taxes have increased, investment in new road capacity has collapsed.

Transport policy has gradually become dominated by a green agenda that seeks to reduce emissions and shift journeys to public transport. In terms of revenues, however, this policy is beginning to backfire.   

Drivers are now buying smaller and more fuel-efficient cars, meaning they pay much less tax. Electric vehicles also threaten a collapse in receipts.

The potential shortfall explains the urgency with which the government is exploring new ways of charging motorists. This week it emerged that officials are considering a two-tier system of road tax, with motorists paying a higher rate if they wish to use motorways.

Charging that better reflects different levels of usage makes sense. But motoring taxes are a very crude way of doing this. Ideally, charges should reflect infrastructure costs and congestion levels. Drivers should pay more to use an expensive urban motorway with huge peak demand than a relatively empty rural motorway, or a minor road that has barely been improved since the 1930s.

In practice an efficient road network can only be obtained through more widespread pricing. The government, however, is not well suited to the management of a tolled network. Pricing and investment decisions would be influenced by special interests and political expediency. Tolls would probably be added on top of existing taxation, or unwarranted environmental levies imposed. Under political control, many of the benefits of road pricing would be lost.

A better long-term solution is therefore to transfer ownership and control to the private sector. Pricing would then be based on consumer demand rather than political calculation. New investment would be directed to those locations where the highest returns could be achieved. Productivity-boosting innovations would also be possible, such as raising speed limits and increasing lorry weights.

But privatisation and pricing need to be combined with a very substantial reduction in motoring taxes to be both politically acceptable and economically efficient. In the IEA’s new report, Which Road Ahead: Government or Market?, we set out a way of achieving this. Flotation receipts from the privatisation of motorways and trunk roads – estimated at around £150 billion – would be used to abolish road tax and reduce fuel duty by at least 75 per cent. Public spending on transport would gradually be phased out and in the longer-term the Treasury would also enjoy a large increase in general tax revenues as efficiency gains such as lower congestion fed through into higher economic output.

The denationalisation of roads is therefore a win-win policy. For most drivers, tax cuts would mean cheaper journeys despite the introduction of tolls. And for the government, substantial short-term flotation receipts would be followed by a lower spending burden and a major boost to the wider economy.

30 October 2012, City AM

Roads must be taken out of political control

The government’s new plan for a two-tier road tax system has many shortcomings. In particular, it fails to address the economic distortions created by a fiscal framework that taxes road users particularly highly compared with other economic activities, including those associated with major environmental costs such as energy and agriculture (which is heavily subsidised).

If the two-tier system were a first stepping stone towards the introduction of a market-based approach to the road network, with an eventual shift towards private ownership, then it could be seen in a more positive light, however. Despite some discussion of granting private companies concessions to manage strategic roads, there is, though, little evidence that the government is seriously considering a genuine transfer of ownership to the private sector. As long as the road network remains under state control, it is likely to continue to suffer from endemic congestion, misdirected investment and poor maintenance.

The incentive structures under state ownership mean that roads policy is driven by political incentives rather than the entrepreneurial discovery and satisfaction of consumer preferences. Politicians may direct road investment in order to raise their chance of getting re-elected. Alternatively, new infrastructure might be provided for a politician’s local area as part of the bargaining process over government spending decisions. The political process is also subject to influence by special interest groups, who have far stronger incentives to engage in lobbying than dispersed groups such as taxpayers and motorists. To some extent, roads policy may be captured by powerful corporate interests seeking to shut out competition by the creation of unfair privileges. Alternatively policy may be unduly influenced by bureaucrats seeking to increase their status or maximise their budgets.

While the relative impact of these different incentives varies, the overall effect is that the allocation of resources is largely based on arbitrary political and bureaucratic decisions rather than on market processes. In combination with the economic calculation problems associated with central planning, the incentives facing politicians and bureaucrats have resulted in a high degree of ‘government failure’ on state-owned roads (see here for case studies). Accordingly, tinkering with road tax will do nothing to tackle underlying institutional failings. The long-term solution is to free the road system from government interference to remove the influence of special interests and allow entrepreneurs to allocate resources more efficiently.

This article is based on the new IEA study, Which Road Ahead: Government or Market?

29 October 2012, IEA Blog

The benefits of motorway privatisation

When governments try to manage infrastructure the results are usually disastrous. Wasteful investment, bloated bureaucracies and political interference are the frequent consequences of state control.

Government owned motorways are no exception. In most countries they are cursed with chronic congestion and delays. Typically there is overcrowding in some locations and overcapacity in others. The supply of road space is almost completely divorced from consumer demand. This is because motorway networks are supplied using methods that are thinly disguised versions of Soviet central planning. Politicians and senior officials decide where new routes will be built with little regard for the needs of road users.

Typically decisions are heavily influenced by special interests. Local or regional governments, together with large corporations, might argue that they need a new motorway to boost economic development in their local area. They will lobby fiercely for funding from national governments or the European Union. Unfortunately this means that the preferences of consumers and taxpayers are neglected and motorways get built in the wrong places.

As well as building motorways in the wrong places, governments also charge the wrong prices. Toll levels are decided by politicians and bureaucrats rather than based on consumer demand. Indeed, in many countries there are no direct charges whatsoever. Motorways are free at the point of use. There is no price mechanism to allocate road space efficiently and unsurprisingly this leads to chronic inter-urban congestion in high-demand locations, as seen for example in the UK and the Netherlands.

The problems associated with state control make a strong case for privatisation. Private owners do not set prices for political reasons; they set them to maximise revenues by attracting customers. And since drivers – particularly those whose time is valuable – do not want to be delayed by congestion, private motorway owners set toll rates at levels that ensure the free flow of traffic. They also vary tolls to make maximum use of capacity. This has an important additional benefit. By maximising the use of existing infrastructure, privatisation reduces the need to construct expensive new routes.

Toll revenues also provide motorway owners with valuable information about where to invest. If prices are high due to strong demand, it may be worthwhile adding new capacity. However, if prices are low this may be a sign that building new infrastructure would not be profitable. In other words, privatisation restores the link between supply and demand, making motorway investment responsive to the needs of road-users.

Privatisation also opens the door to innovation and entrepreneurship on the motorways. Private owners could, for example, decide to increase speed limits to reduce journey times. Or perhaps they might allow heavier trucks to use their routes. They could also provide a range of additional services for their customers or even decide to make money from developing land alongside interchanges with shops, offices and housing.

By allowing entrepreneurs to experiment and discover new ways of serving their customers, motorway privatisation has the potential to inject much needed dynamism into the transport sector, bringing very substantial efficiency gains. These benefits depend, however, on politicians and state officials renouncing control.

If governments transfer motorways to the private sector but heavily regulate the new owners then most of the benefits will be lost. For example, the regulation of prices could jeopardise attempts to tackle congestion, while speed and weight restrictions could limit the scope for productivity gains.

Many previous privatisation programmes have been undermined by the retention of tight political control. Privatised electricity markets across Europe have been rigged by governments to promote renewable energy, while privatised railways have been forced to operate under complex regulatory structures that have seen costs explode.

These mistakes must be avoided when motorways are transferred to the private sector. The new private owners must be free to experiment and innovate without being stifled by the dead hand of the state.

The rewards from genuine privatisation will be enormous – lower congestion, massive efficiency gains and new investment where it’s most needed. And there is a further benefit that will be particularly welcomed by politicians: the prospect of huge flotation receipts from the sale of motorways to private investors. In an era when public debt is reaching dangerous levels, more and more countries are likely to take advantage of this potential windfall.

September 2012, SSE

Gearing up for growth: how reforming roads policy can aid economic recovery

The efficiency of the transport sector has a significant impact on the wider economy. Only housing takes a larger share of household spending, while transport is also a major business cost. Accordingly, transport improvements have the potential to bring significant productivity gains. Faster and cheaper journeys enable greater economies of scale, more trade and increased labour mobility. Efficiency gains in transport are clearly a major driver of economic growth.

In this context, it is difficult to overestimate the economic damage done by the last government. Its approach ignored the fact that around 85 per cent of passenger travel within the UK is by private car, compared with 8 per cent by rail. Roads also carry 65 per cent of freight traffic, while rail only accounts for 9 per cent.

The economic importance of roads is therefore an order of magnitude greater than other modes. And despite the wishes of environmentalists, this is unlikely to change. Serving low-density suburbs and rural areas with frequent train services would be prohibitively expensive. Moreover, many journeys simply take too long on public transport, particularly if they involve multiple destinations. Immense time savings are achieved by the door-to-door convenience of cars, vans and lorries.

New Labour denied the economic logic behind the dominance of road transport. It focused investment on the loss-making rail network and launched a ‘war on the motorist’ designed to push people out of their cars. 

Across the UK road improvements were cancelled, capacity removed, bus and cycling lanes introduced, parking restricted, pavements widened and speed limits reduced. The number of traffic controls exploded.

Councils received central government grants to deter private motoring and incentivise more people to use other modes. Scant regard was given to the economic impact.

As a result Britain’s 35 million drivers faced longer journey times; firms suffered higher transport costs; productivity decreased. Taxpayers also faced growing bills for uneconomic tram lines and often poorly used bus and train services. For several years, rail subsidies exceeded fare revenues.

Such anti-business transport policies were ill-conceived in the boom times, but in the context of prolonged recession their continuation is scandalous. But unfortunately the coalition has so far adopted a similar approach.

New Labour’s transport bureaucracies, such as Transport for London, have remained intact, and little effort has been made to address their ideological hostility to private transport. They continue to deploy harmful measures that place questionable social and environmental objectives above the urgent need for increased economic efficiency.

At the same time, the government is squandering billions on uneconomic rail projects such as Crossrail and High Speed 2, the former costing £16 billion and the latter at least £33 billion. To put this into perspective, the total expenditure on just these two schemes could build approximately 1,500 miles of six-lane motorway, which would realistically carry more than twice the passenger and freight traffic using the entire rail network.

Indeed, the government’s own figures show that road improvements produce far higher economic returns than public transport projects. This is the case despite severe distortions to the transport market caused by discriminatory taxation. While most rail passengers are subsidised by taxpayers and pay no VAT, motorists and hauliers are burdened with the fuel duty supertax, road tax and VAT.

It is difficult to justify such differential treatment. Egalitarian arguments might apply to buses but certainly not to trains. Rail users are on average much wealthier than the general population. A high proportion of passengers are well-paid middle-class commuters from the home counties.

The environmental arguments don’t stack up either. By incentivising passengers to live further and further from their place of work, public transport subsidies encourage lifestyles that are likely to be more carbon-intensive overall. And some forms of public transport are actually less green than motoring. High speed trains use approximately twice as much energy per passenger mile as modern, fuel-efficient cars. Then, of course, there are all the underused bus and train services that use large vehicles to carry just a handful of passengers. The average bus service carries just 9 people.

It is indefensible, from both an economic and environmental perspective, that taxpayers are forced to subsidise bus and train services that provide such miniscule benefits. At the same time, there is no good rationale for continuing to spend taxpayers’ money on measures that deliberately lower the efficiency of the road network, needlessly heaping additional costs on motorists and businesses.

A shift in this approach could rapidly deliver major economic gains. The government should adopt a win-win policy that lowers the tax burden by cutting subsidies to uneconomic public transport services while at the same time freeing road users from unnecessary burdens.

A good start would be cutting off the flow of money to anti-car measures, encouraging local authorities to rip out most of their traffic controls (which create congestion while doing nothing to improve safety). Underused bus and cycle lanes – that waste vast amounts of valuable road space – should also be removed, together with bus and cycle priority measures that cause delays. Parking restrictions should be limited to the few areas where there is a genuine shortage of space.

The government should push through increases in speed limits as a matter of urgency. This would quickly translate into significant time savings, bringing a much need productivity boost to the economy, while making little difference to overall road safety.

But the policy needs to go much further than raising the limit to 80mph on small sections of the motorway network. Safe dual carriageways should be included, while some single carriageway locations may also be suitable for 70mph running. In addition, coach and bus limits should be increased to the same speed as cars.

There is a particularly strong economic case for raising limits for goods vehicles – a measure likely to improve safety by preventing the bunching of traffic and reducing overtaking. Perhaps heavier lorries could be permitted, including the multi-trailer road-trains commonplace in Canada and Australia.

Significant economic benefits would also come from a more rational approach to transport investment. Currently public transport projects with low returns are given priority over road schemes with high returns. This is a very poor use of scarce resources if growth is the key priority. A rational transport strategy would prioritise investments with the highest returns, without modal bias.

Looking further ahead, the ownership and management of transport infrastructure should gradually be moved from government to the private sector. Private investors have much stronger incentives to allocate their funds wisely and to provide services that respond to the needs of consumers. They cannot force taxpayers to cover their costs and guarantee the financial risks. While politicians and senior officials are swayed by special interest lobbying, the private sector focuses on commercial viability.

The mismanagement of Britain’s transport infrastructure is therefore a symptom of its politicisation. While policymakers can deliver substantial efficiency gains by applying economic logic to their decisions, the best long-term solution is to transfer control to the private sector.

September 2012, Crossbow

Privatisation and pricing are the keys to an efficient roads sector

Economic crises often lead to big policy changes. Heavily indebted governments seek new funding sources and growth becomes a top priority.

The current slowdown is already having a large impact on transport policy. Cuts in public spending have led to the cancellation of many schemes. Yet investment in transport is desperately needed to bolster economic recovery.

The British government appears to have found a solution. The Prime Minister recently announced plans for the private sector to build and operate new trunk roads and motorways. Under one option being considered, the construction of new capacity would be funded by tolls paid by drivers, while existing roads would be leased by private firms who would receive ‘shadow tolls’ paid by the government. The Treasury would save hundreds of millions per year by no longer funding new road schemes and could also receive a short-term windfall by selling off leases for existing routes.

But the plans fall a long way short of full privatisation. The schemes will be subject to very stringent government supervision, probably along the lines of heavily regulated utility industries such as water. Sadly, this means the entrepreneurship and innovation that makes the genuine private sector so dynamic will be suffocated. The benefits will be a tiny fraction of the gains that a more radical programme of road privatisation would bring. And these benefits are far beyond those that would be achieved by introducing a government-run road pricing system.

Perhaps the most noticeable impact would be a reduction in congestion, which is estimated to cost the UK economy about £20 billion per annum. Private road owners could introduce variable pricing to make sure their customers avoided delays. They would also have strong incentives to make the most efficient use of existing infrastructure. Lower off-peak tolls would help spread traffic more evenly and help ensure that drivers with a low value of time did not impose expensive delays on those with a high value of time.

It is instructive to contrast the incentives facing private road owners with those of governments implementing road pricing schemes. Politicians and bureaucrats would face strong pressure from special interests to exempt favoured groups (for example, black cabs are exempt from the London Congestion Charge). Toll rates would be set for political reasons rather than to maximise profits by providing a good service to drivers. This can be seen on public transport, where fare levels are often determined with little or no regard for congestion levels. Tolls could also be used as an additional form of taxation, for example to fund bus or tram schemes. Redistribution to other transport modes was a key element of both the London Congestion Charge and the proposed Manchester road-pricing scheme.

In all likelihood, government controlled road pricing would end up costing the economy dearly. It would almost certainly be imposed on top of existing taxes such as fuel duty. Existing distortions to the transport market would therefore be magnified. In practical terms this would mean more peak-time commuters being forced onto already overcrowded public transport links, with their regulated fares and massive state subsidies. Political pressure would grow for more state spending on expensive train, tram and bus infrastructure.

A further danger comes from administration costs. Whereas private business have strong incentives to minimise running costs in order to maximise profits, government officials are incentivised to increase bureaucracy to raise their budgets and expand their remit. It is quite conceivable that some kind of complex road pricing system could end up being as expensive and disastrous as other big government IT projects. Admin costs could easily destroy a large part of the benefits of road pricing.

Perhaps the biggest danger of all, however, is that road pricing would become a key part of the government’s green agenda. It could be used as a command and control mechanism to drive motorists off the road to help meet ambitious climate change targets. The economic costs – reduced labour mobility, less competition and specialisation, smaller economies of scale – could well be subsumed by environmentalist objectives.

In this context, it is understandable that many motorists and road-user groups are vociferously opposed to the introduction of pricing. The key to the successful implementation of road pricing is therefore to take the politics out – which in practice means transferring control from government to private owners and local communities. Moreover, the dynamism of the entrepreneurial private sector would quickly deliver benefits to motorists, helping to address their doubts about pricing.

The largest benefits would come from a more commercial approach to investment. Profit-seeking entrepreneurs would tend to build new roads in areas of high demand. They would also consider factors such as construction costs and the possibility of additional returns from land development along the route. In this way, a private road market would tailor new routes to the preferences of customers. This contrasts markedly with state provision of infrastructure.

Governments tend to put politics first and economics second. Decisions on new roads tend to be made for political reasons rather than to maximise returns – although cost-benefit analyses do at least weed out some of the worst schemes. Environmental groups might succeed in stopping a scheme even when its economic benefits are substantial. Local councils might lobby for a new link to promote regeneration in their area. One of the worst examples of politicisation is the Humber Bridge, which opened in 1981. This loss-making project was the direct result of a blatant election bribe by the Minister of Transport during the 1966 Hull North by-election.

As a result of politicised decision making, patterns of road provision may bear little relation to patterns of consumer demand. There may be gaping holes in the network, such as the absence of a direct motorway link between Manchester and Sheffield. At the same time, many rural links are underused with vast overcapacity while urban routes – particularly in the South-East of England – are overcrowded.

Private ownership can bring much needed economic rationality to road investment. The introduction of pricing would provide valuable information for road entrepreneurs about where expanding capacity would be most profitable. And private road-builders would be far less susceptible than politicians and bureaucrats to interest groups looking for special privileges at taxpayers’ expense.

Then there is the issue of innovation. Under state control, roads are subject to one-size-fits-all regulations that stifle new ideas and hamper efficiency gains. With private roads, owners could be free to devise rules that were appropriate for both their customers and their infrastructure.

On safe stretches of motorway, speed limits could be increased, delivering significant time savings. Some of the largest benefits would accrue to low-income travellers using coaches, which are currently limited to 100 kph within the European Union. Removing that limit could deliver a revolution in low-cost travel.

Weight restrictions on goods vehicles are another area that could benefit from the flexibility of private road markets. Huge productivity gains would be possible by raising the maximum weight and indeed by allowing the multi-trailer ‘road trains’ seen in countries such as Australia and Canada. Private road owners would, of course, have to trade-off the benefits with the costs associated with increased wear and tear, the impact on other road customers and so on.

Although the UK government is focusing on motorways and trunk roads, it should not neglect the benefits of privatising local roads. In some parts of the world, including Sweden, many local roads are owned and maintained by private road associations, whose members are residents and businesses. In many developing countries such as Brazil and South Africa, large private communities administer roads and other infrastructure, effectively taking on the role of local government.

Private ownership means road infrastructure can be far more responsive to local needs. For example, there is evidence that Swedish road associations are far more efficient at maintaining roads than governments. Since local residents own the infrastructure, faults such as potholes are reported quickly and repaired – before more serious damage takes place that would be far more expensive to fix.

In areas plagued by high crime rates and anti-social behaviour, private ownership enables residents to restrict access to their streets. Indeed, in some African cities, locals have even gone as far as illegally taking control of streets by erecting barriers without the permission of local authorities. This is viewed by residents as one of the most effective ways of securing their neighbourhoods.
 
Communities can also determine rules on parking and speed limits that suit their particular circumstances. For example, residents of a street containing young familes might decide to impose a very low speed limit for safety reasons. 

The privatisation of local roads therefore seems very much in tune with UK plans to hand back power to communities, whether through the localism or ‘Big Society’ agendas. The British government will therefore miss a golden opportunity if it places severe restrictions on private road owners. Instead, it should be freeing the road sector from deadening state control. Once unleashed, entrepreneurial creativity and local knowledge will deliver enormous social and economic gains.

20 May 2012, InfraNews